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R E T H I N K I N G  T H E  C O M M O N  G O O D :  
T H E O L O G Y  A N D  T H E  F U T U R E  O F  W E L FA R E 1
Elaine Graham
Samuel Ferguson Professor of Social & Patoral Theology
University of Manchester
i n t r o d u c t i o n
When Gordon Brown succeeded Tony Blair as British Prime Minister in 
June 2007, there was widespread speculation that he would call a “snap” 
General Election for sometime later that year. By early 2008, however, 
Brown’s prevarication over the question, coupled with the onset of recession, 
saw his early lead in the opinion polls vanish. Labour will have to stage a 
miraculous electoral comeback to remain in Government, and the question 
now is whether Brown will be deposed as leader or see out the rest of this 
parliamentary term, which could extend as late as May 2011. Whatever 
happens, however, one of the issues likely to preoccupy political debate 
between now and the next election is the question of welfare reform. 
There is currently widespread talk in British politics of a radical overhaul 
of the public sector and the way welfare is ﬁnanced and delivered.2 Over 
the past years, no fewer than three central government departments have 
published reports on the role of voluntary and community groups3 – the 
so-called “third sector” – in the delivery of mainstream welfare provision, 
social services and economic and social regeneration.4 The opposition 
134 Colloquium 40/2 2008
5 Conservative Party Social Justice Policy Group, Breakthrough Britain: Ending Costs of Social 
Breakdown (London: 2007).
6 Francis Davis, Elizabeth Paulhus and Andrew Bradstock (eds), Moral, But No Compass? 
Government, Church and the Future of Welfare (London: Matthew James, 2008), 13.
Conservative party published a 700-page report the same year, entitled 
Breakthrough Britain, which proposes new measures to strengthen the family 
and foster new forms of voluntary action and social enterprise in order to 
combat poverty.5 Both major parties, therefore, look set to go into the next 
General Election with major new proposals for the delivery of welfare which 
involve a signiﬁcant reconﬁguration of the relationship between the State 
and the voluntary sector. 
This potential area of policy reform is made all the more important since 
religion, in the shape of what are often termed “faith-based organizations,” 
is conceived by both parties as having a prominent role to play within this 
new dispensation. If, as seems likely, the third sector of voluntary and 
community organizations will be invited to bid for state funding as part of 
the “outsourcing” of services through competitive tendering to run essential 
welfare services, then religious groups will comprise a major sector of 
that emerging tier of service providers. Most relevant for this discussion 
is that it is to Australia that many of those policy-makers are looking for 
models and precedents, not only in the increasing role of voluntary agencies 
alongside the State but in the prominence of churches and other faith-based 
organizations within that. 
But clearly there are many critical questions that need to be asked. Are 
faith-based organizations adequately equipped to respond to this coming 
challenge? Do they have the capacity in terms of resources and personnel, 
particularly at a time when, like many other Western societies, religious 
aﬃliation, at least in mainstream Christianity and Judaism, is on the decline? 
Do faith-based organizations have the public trust to take on such a major 
role? And have any of the faith groups even begun to think in any systematic 
fashion about what they might be getting into? 
A Christian think tank, the von Hügel Institute, was recently commissioned 
by the Church of England to investigate some of these questions and in 
particular to estimate the actual scale of the Church’s involvement with 
welfare reform. Its report concluded that “when it comes to faith communities 
in general, and aspects of charity law and social policy in particular, the 
government is planning blind [sic] and failing parts of civil society ... The 
government has good intentions, but is moral without a compass.”6 These 
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interim ﬁndings suggest that whilst both Government and opposition are 
looking to churches to play a prominent role in their new proposals for the 
third sector, there is little reliable evidence on the actual scale of involvement 
and even less “religious literacy” about such organizations’ infrastructure, 
core values or capacity. The research discovered “profound mismatches 
and misperceptions” between the Church of England’s understanding 
of its current and potential role and that of policy-makers, and called on 
Government to build up a more substantial evidence base on the “wide-
ranging civic contribution of the Churches.”7 Yet the report also made the 
point that the Church itself, indeed all the churches, have done little serious 
thinking of their own, including any “sustained theological reﬂection” on 
the issues.8 
The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to review the debate about faith 
communities as welfare providers; but then, to move to consider what 
theological models might inform this renewed role for the churches in 
society, and whether there needs to be some renewed thinking in the area 
of public theology in order to come to terms with the fundamental changes 
that seem inevitable, whatever the outcome of the next British General 
Election. 
r e t h i n k i n g  w e l fa r e
As my introduction indicated, the current debate in the UK forges some 
interesting links with Australian welfare policy. John Hutton, the then Work 
and Pensions Secretary,9 visited in February 2007 and seemed particularly 
interested in arrangements for the outsourcing of Employment and job-
seeking services to voluntary agencies such as churches. Hutton’s return to 
the UK was timed to coincide with a series of seminars and consultations on 
welfare reform and the publication of another independently-commissioned 
report by a business entrepreneur, David Freud. The Freud report itself 
contained an analysis of the Australian situation, and in particular attempts 
to increase participation rates amongst the 4% or so of the workforce on 
long-term incapacity beneﬁt or other forms of income support.10 It notes 
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the element of means-testing within the Newstart scheme for people aged 
21 and over, and the linking of youth jobseeker beneﬁt to participation 
in approved schemes of education and training. Responsibility for these 
services has been devolved to the private or voluntary sector. 
But church leaders themselves have also been taking an interest in 
agencies such as UnitingCare and Anglicare, whose extensive portfolio of 
services spans everything from cradle to grave.11 Stephen Lowe, the Church 
of England’s Bishop for Urban Life and Faith, also conducted a fact-ﬁnding 
visit to Australia in August 2007, and reported to the von Hügel researchers 
that Anglicare was the largest non-governmental children’s and family 
welfare agency in Australia, managing a range of services such as fostering, 
emergency relief for homeless families, aid to families on low incomes, 
counselling for survivors of abuse and neglect, rehabilitation care for 
recovering addicts, youth accommodation and mediation and chaplaincy 
services for young oﬀenders. Anglicare’s blend of Federal, State and local 
government funding is becoming the norm in the Australian system, but 
would represent a signiﬁcant shift in the relationship between State and 
voluntary sector for the delivery of mainstream social services if anything 
similar were to be adopted in the UK.12
The attraction of the “third sector” for Government appears to be a 
combination of localism, ﬂexibility and value-for-money. It is in keeping 
with Government’s call for “partnerships” between various stakeholders, 
and envisages that the third sector has a role to play not only in “service 
delivery” but also in capacity-building within local communities for 
the direct provision of services as well as generating further funding for 
supplementary projects through social enterprise. It is believed within 
Government that some “state” services, such as post oﬃces, public transport 
and academies (schools in disadvantaged areas) might be better run as 
neighbourhood businesses since they are more eﬃcient, can reﬂect local 
participation and be more ﬂexible (which reduces the need for government 
subsidies). 
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The Government recognises the value of the diversity of organisations in 
the sector providing voice for under represented groups, in campaigning 
for change, in creating strong, active and connected communities, in 
promoting enterprising solutions to social and environmental challenges 
and in transforming the design and delivery of public services.13 
The Treasury’s Comprehensive Spending Review for 2007 also focused on 
the role of the third sector in social and economic regeneration, especially at 
local neighbourhood level. The third sector promises capability of “bridging” 
social capital, delivering locally-based solutions and services, being ﬂexible 
in times of change and being eﬀective in linking up with “hard-to-reach” 
and under-represented groups, especially Black and minority ethnic 
communities:
The “third sector” comprises non-governmental organisations which are 
value-driven and which principally reinvest their surpluses to further 
social, environmental or cultural objectives. It includes voluntary and 
community organisations, charities, social enterprises, cooperatives and 
mutuals. Faith groups also play a very important role. The third sector is 
large and growing, and plays an increasingly vital role in both society and 
economy.14
For the opposition Conservative party, anxious to shake oﬀ its image as “the 
nasty party” unconcerned with a social justice agenda, the publication of 
Breakthrough Britain has been an important part of its return to electoral 
credibility. For Conservative thinking on welfare, a strong third sector 
stands as a viable alternative to a centralised, highly-taxed State, whilst 
fostering traditional Tory values of voluntarism, personal responsibility 
and subsidiarity. Breakthrough Britain argues that welfare policy must 
be aimed at addressing the roots of deprivation (interpreted as resting in 
family breakdown) and strengthening people’s moral self-reliance, rather 
than providing unlimited income support for those who fail. This requires 
13 Department of Communities and Local Government, “Third Sector Strategy”, 2007, n.p. 
[cited 14 June 2007]. Online: http://www.communities.gov.uk/index/asp?id=1510989.
14 HM Treasury/Cabinet Oﬃce, “The Future Role of the Third Sector in Social and Economic 
Regeneration,” 2006, n.p. Online: 
 http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/documents/public_spending_reporting/charity_third_sector.
html.
138 Colloquium 40/2 2008
15 Ben Jupp, “The Persistence of Faiths,” Demos Quarterly 11 (1997): 3.
partnership between state and voluntary sector, a solution that harnesses 
the potential of civil society to promote social justice. 
Whilst churches and other faith communities have played a major role 
in welfare, either to alleviate hardship or to provide basic services such 
as health, education and social care, since the foundation of the Welfare 
State their position, like other voluntary and charitable bodies, has been 
ambivalent. Rather than being substitutes for State provision (the tendency 
of Conservative governments) or threats to the State (the tendency of 
Labour governments), they are now cast as partners with government. But 
where has the language of “partnership” come from? This, too, has a context 
and a history, and is tied up with policy developments under New Labour 
over a decade. 
n e w  l a b o u r ,  r e l i g i o n  a n d  t h e  c o m m o n  g o o d
Since the election of the ﬁrst Blair administration in 1997, there has been 
a succession of documents explicitly aﬃrming the participation of faith 
communities in local regeneration. The centre-left think tank Demos 
referred to a “new covenant” between government and faith-based agencies, 
noting that the latter had often been responsible for innovative projects in 
areas such as primary health care, homelessness, community regeneration 
and drug-related services, particularly in the way they had been “pioneers in 
taking account of the full range of human needs when providing care.”15 
The Urban White Paper, published in 2000, identiﬁed faith communities 
as a crucial means by which a broad cross-section of a local community 
might participate in local projects. Similarly, in 2002 the Local Government 
Association drew up a guide for local authorities on how to include 
faith-based groups in neighbourhood renewal. Once again, faith-based 
organizations correspond to the New Labour vision in providing one of the 
well-springs of social capital on which a ﬂourishing civil society depends. 
This was a sign, possibly, that those in local government were aware of 
the presence of substantial religious groups but lacked knowledge and 
experience of accessing or working with them. Faith-based organizations 
were also seen as capable of connecting with those “hard-to-reach” groups, 
especially in relation to minority ethnic and inner city communities. 
They have local resources and voluntary labour, as well as long-term 
commitments to neighbourhoods. So this report continues the mood of 
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earlier documents in stressing the untapped potential of faith communities 
and the need to integrate them into government strategies, especially for the 
most marginalised neighbourhoods.
This recovery of the language of faith communities also occurs against the 
background of the popularity of communitarianism as a political philosophy 
and its inﬂuence on Tony Blair and New Labour. Communitarianism attempts 
to synthesise the discourse of individualism and personal responsibility 
with an appeal to localism and subsidiarity as the most eﬀective means 
of delivering social cohesion.16 This, and New Labour’s acceptance of the 
power of the market, both legitimated the withdrawal of the State from 
direct provision of welfare and drove the search for partners who embodied 
these civic virtues. Once again, religion seemed to ﬁt the bill.
 And so not surprisingly, as part of this current review of policy, faith-
based organizations as a part of the third sector has ﬁgured prominently 
in Government consultations, culminating in a seminar in Manchester in 
February 2007 between Jim Murphy, Minister for Employment and Welfare 
Reform, and a number of faith leaders at which the minister argued, “Just 
because it is the Government’s role to ensure there is service provision for 
all, it does not necessarily follow that it is also Government’s role to deliver 
that service …” 17 Murphy went on to argue that faith groups embody the 
localism, ﬂexibility, trust and motivation to achieve that. 
So for Government, religion represents a particularly eﬀective agent of 
social capital (and social cohesion). Yet others sound notes of caution or 
criticism. First, of course, is the view that religion has no legitimate place 
in the public domain, and certainly not in the delivery of essential welfare 
services. The assumption that faith is a reasonable and liberal set of values 
which engenders good citizenship and social cohesion is repudiated. After 
9/11 the spectre of fatally bifurcated towns and cities, segregated on ethnic 
and religious lines, began to appear. Far from being an agent of social 
cohesion, religion was seen as exercising a divisive inﬂuence in a community. 
At the very least, as Rob Furbey and Marie Macey argue, government – and 
faith communities themselves – may need to recognise the negative as well 
as positive potential of religion: “Like potent secular ideologies, [religion] 
16 Greg Smith, “Faith in Community and Communities of Faith? Government Rhetoric and 
Religious Identity in Urban Britain,” Journal of Contemporary Religion 19 (2004): 188.
17 Jim Murphy, “Seminar on Partnership with Employment Focus – What Role for Faith 
Groups in Today’s Welfare State?” n.p. [cited 14 June 2007]. Online: http://www.dwp.gov.uk/
aboutus/2007/19-02-07.asp.
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can unite or divide, include or exclude; it can provide the impetus to struggle 
for social justice or it can legitimise cruelty and oppression; it can promote 
social cohesion or conﬂict.”18
In contrast to the positive virtues cited earlier, other Government evidence 
showed up this ambivalence. The Cantle report on urban riots in Northern 
English cities in 2001, for example, spoke of communities living parallel but 
separate lives, of religion as a divisive rather than cohesive force. And of 
course any faith group or interest group may be very eﬀective at delivering 
services to its own constituency – in what would be termed “bonding” social 
capital19 – whilst being indiﬀerent to extending beyond its own boundaries. 
Yet do such ambitions on the part of Government even correspond 
with the aspirations of people of faith? Some have argued that government 
expectations are simply an outworking of a kind of “functionalist” view of 
religion, in which its role is to transmit benevolent values of active citizenship 
and tolerance, and to maximise local communities’ social capital only insofar 
as it is tied into partnership with government schemes of regeneration and 
welfare delivery. There is anxiety that cost-cutting is the “real” rather than 
the “presenting” agenda, or that such initiatives are designed to co-opt faith 
groups into serving the government’s political ends for social cohesion.20 
It has also been argued that local authorities display a lack of what might 
be termed “religious literacy”: that much of the rhetoric about “faith” is 
actually a cloak for talking about Black and Minority ethnic groups, but that 
lack of proper information about diﬀerent communities mean that many 
authorities confuse race/ethnicity with religion, and fail to take account of 
cultural and political diﬀerences between faith groups.21 
Faith groups themselves may be suspicious of getting involved, even 
if they are in sympathy with the stated values of community, welfare and 
active citizenship. This may be as a matter of principle, a view that too close 
an identiﬁcation with the State (especially receipt of funding) represents a 
betrayal of a radical call for justice or a diversion from other priorities such 
as caring for their own members. Greg Smith argues on the basis of empirical 
research in Newham, a borough of London, and Preston, a city in the North-
West of England, that many faith groups are simply too overwhelmed by the 
18 Robert Furbey and Marie Macey, “Religion and Urban Regeneration: A Place for Faith?” 
Policy and Politics, 33 (2005): 115.
19 Stephen Aldridge, David Halpern and Sarah Fitzpatrick, Social Capital: A Discussion Paper 
(London: Performance and Innovation Unit, 2002).
20 Smith, “Faith in Community,” 118.
21 See Moral, But No Compass? 5.
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needs of their own members; and that many fragile groups are deterred by 
the culture of government funding and ﬁnd the prospect of writing grant 
applications and tenders simply too complex and bureaucratic. Evidence 
suggests that many local groups often lack the information about what 
opportunities exist, or how funding can be accessed.22
At a seminar on religion and the third sector for faith leaders held with 
the then minister for Work and Pensions, Jim Murphy, in Manchester in 
February 2007, one speaker in particular sounded several notes of caution. 
Roland Sewell of the Salvation Army argued that involvement in care and 
welfare was “in the DNA” of movements such as his.23 Religious organizations 
have a long and illustrious history of welfare, and have often pioneered areas 
subsequently taken over by the State. But the new dispensation of welfare 
reform carries substantial challenges which could fatally compromise the 
freedom of the faith-based sector. These Sewell characterized as competition, 
compliance, corporatisation and commercialism.
Firstly, there are dangers of falling into the ethos of competitive tendering, 
where the success of a bid may depend more on “the narrative skill of the 
bid writer rather than the competence of the provider.”24 Evidence suggests 
that many faith-based organizations – indeed much of the voluntary sector 
altogether – are already ﬁnding their essential mission is distorted by the 
cycle of funding, and of bearing the burden of maintaining excess staﬀ 
capacity to be deployed into bid-writing. “Do not assume that we are able to 
absorb the risk or divert valuable resources to operate within a procurement 
system which makes massive demands upon the provider without assurances 
of outcomes.”25 
Secondly, Sewell speaks of the risk of compliance to narrow outcomes or 
meeting prescriptive requirements; there has been much talk in the UK about 
Australia’s “star rating” systems, leading to micromanagement and increased 
administration of reporting, as opposed to delivering value for money to 
end-users.26 Thirdly, there is what Sewell calls corporatisation, meaning the 
need to develop large administrative infrastructures to monitor and manage 
funding and meet quality regulations. Faith-based organizations may lose 
22 Smith, “Faith in Community.”
23 Roland Sewell, “The Role of Faith-Based Groups in Welfare Provision. 19th February 2007,” 
n.p. [cited 14 June 2007]. Online: http://www.dwp.gov.uk/welfarereform/seminars/r-sewell-
19-02-07.asp.
24 Sewell, “The Role of Faith-Based Groups in Welfare Provision.” 
25 Sewell, “The Role of Faith-Based Groups in Welfare Provision.” 
26 A culture of external scrutiny which many believe has already blighted the public sector. 
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ﬂexibility as a result. Finally, the imperatives of commercialism serve to 
undermine innovative forms of provision in the form of subsidies to areas 
that are worthwhile but not cost-eﬀective. The fear is particularly that those 
on the margins will suﬀer, and asylum-seekers are the group most often 
cited; who will attend to the most under-serviced or marginalised, those 
who currently slip through the safety net?
Overall, therefore, blanket references to “faith” and “faith communities” 
as heterogeneous, unproblematic and necessarily “on-message” in terms of 
the objectives of statutory bodies may therefore need to be challenged in 
favour of a more nuanced and contextual understanding of how faith-based 
participation actually functions in particular circumstances.27 It may be that 
there are a number of diﬀerent possibilities for faith-based organizations to 
shape and help implement government policy, and that one of the things 
that needs to be talked about further is the possibility of there being a whole 
range of models of engagement between faith and service delivery. But has 
any sustained theological thinking been taking place around all this?
t h e  l e g a c y  o f  c h r i s t i a n  s o c i a l  t h o u g h t
When the British Labour government of 1945-1951 passed the legislation 
that established the various arms of the post-war Welfare State, it did so 
eﬀectively with the blessing of one of the most prominent Christian social 
thinkers of his generation. In 1942, on the publication of the Beveridge 
Report, which set out many of the basic principles of what would become the 
Welfare State, the Archbishop of Canterbury, William Temple, hailed it as 
“the ﬁrst time anyone had set out to embody the whole spirit of the Christian 
ethic in an Act of Parliament.” Temple’s inﬂuence within both church and 
society was regarded as seminal in generating much of the popular support 
for Beveridge which undoubtedly contributed to Labour’s landslide victory 
in 1945. Temple remained a towering ﬁgure within Anglican social thought 
for the next half-century, providing a robust theological rationale for much 
of the Church of England’s involvement in social aﬀairs. Yet Temple’s 
assumption that the challenges of providing comprehensive welfare “from 
cradle to grave” necessitated a centralised system funded by taxation and 
“scientiﬁcally administered” by local and national government, albeit 
complemented by voluntary action is now looking out-dated. 
27 Richard Farnell et al. “Faith” in Urban Regeneration: Engaging Faith Communities in Urban 
Regeneration (Bristol: Polity, 2003).
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In his defence, Temple’s theologically-grounded enthusiasm for the 
Welfare State according to Labour reﬂected a strand of Christian social ethics 
that regarded “secular reason” and the arms of the State as perfectly capable 
of embodying and fulﬁlling the deepest values of Gospel. Temple deployed 
the notion of the “common good” as designating the benchmark of a decent 
society, the concept towards which a welfare system should aspire.28 It 
reﬂected a view of human nature and society as essentially interconnected, 
in which the values of mutuality, service and equality are paramount. This 
vision deeply informed the writing of Temple’s Christianity and Social Order, 
also published in 1942,29 which came to dominate the mainstream churches’ 
thinking on social aﬀairs and informed reports such as Faith in the City 
(1985)30 and The Common Good (1986),31 as well as the work of theologians 
such as Ronald Preston and John Atherton. 
Although elements of the British welfare system, such as old age pensions 
and free education, were already in existence, the legislation after 1945 
established a State-controlled, centralized infrastructure which set in place 
a universal welfare system. The demands of the 1939-45 war had created 
an unprecedented level of government intervention and control over the 
lives of ordinary people, and it was perhaps that experience which made it 
acceptable for the State to adopt such a major role. It was about managing 
the market to achieve social ends via essentially Keynesian methods of 
taxation and centralized State planning. 
The givenness of the Welfare State dominated left-of-centre political 
thinking from the 1940s, and although the Thatcher government from 
1979 reversed some of the legislation, the political stance of the mainstream 
churches stood in opposition to cuts in public expenditure, via successive 
reports such as Faith in the City (1985) and Not Just for the Poor (1987).32 
Yet that intellectual legacy and the iconic position of Temple may have 
inhibited Christian social ethics of the time from undertaking any serious 
re-evaluation of the state welfare model, or fully to engage with Conservative 
(and eventually, New Labour) revisionist thinking which challenged the 
28 John Atherton, Public Theology for Changing Times (London: SPCK, 2000), 79
29 William Temple, Christianity and Social Order (London: SCM, 1942).
30 Archbishop’s Commission on Urban Priority Areas, Faith in the City (London: Church 
House, 1985).
31 Bishops’ Conference of England and Wales, the Common Good and the Catholic Church’s 
Social Teaching (London: Catholic Bishops’ Conference of England and Wales, 1996).
32 Church of England Board for Social Responsibility, Not Just for the Poor: Christian Perspectives 
on the Welfare State (London: Church House, 1987).
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bureaucracy and elitism of large-scale bureaucracy, and which dared to 
question the hegemony of the expert. “The need for careful planning and 
management meant that the execution of political and economic decisions 
became the preserve of the expert. Consequently churches and other 
voluntary groups were not the primary agents of welfare … but were to be 
understood simply as more or less prophetic institutions helping to shape 
public policy.”33 Mark Chapman has argued that this represented a missed 
opportunity to engage directly with public policy and resulted in this 
tradition elevating the State as the sole arbiter of the common good at the 
expense of other perspectives. 
Yet even back in the mid-1980s, various commentators such as Stephen 
Orchard were saying that the churches had done little serious thinking about 
“the question of what is Christian about a Welfare State”34 or indeed whether 
there might be more “Christian” ways of organizing the provision of such 
facilities such as education, training, income support and health care.
So what is the way ahead? Before we consider this, we need to give further 
thought to the way in which consideration of the churches’ involvement in 
social policy is now framed by two key objections, both of which reject the 
idea of faith-based intervention in public policy or welfare provision: one 
from a secular, and one from a theological perspective. 
1 .  Secul ar Objections  
Any attempt by government to create a more prominent role for faith-based 
groups within an expanding third sector is likely to be controversial. As 
I have been explaining, there is government interest in the contributions 
of faith communities, but there is also signiﬁcant public unease, even 
suspicion. This may in part be an expression of what is sometimes termed 
“Islamophobia” in the wake of 9/11 and 7/7, and there is no doubt that there 
are racial and religious tensions in many communities in Britain. In 2001, 
there were serious riots in some Northern towns, and instances of school 
students lobbying to wear items of religious dress inevitably generate much 
media coverage. The government recently had to withdraw proposals to 
require all faith schools to recruit 25% of their students from other faith 
traditions, and many people regard them as an impediment to social 
33 Mark Chapman, “Ronald Preston, William Temple, and the Future of Christian Politics,” 
Studies in Christian Ethics 17 (2004): 171.
34 Stephen Orchard, A Christian Appreciation of the Welfare State (London: British Council of 
Churches, 1985), 1.
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cohesion and integration. There has also been resistance on the part of some 
local authorities to fund faith-based organizations for fear of being accused 
of giving public funding for proselytization. And quite legitimately in many 
cases, faith groups are perceived as less than sensitive to certain equal 
opportunities issues such as the needs of women or lesbian, gay, bisexual or 
transgendered clients or workers. 
We can also see this political embarrassment about the public nature 
of faith in many places. When the allies ﬁrst went into Iraq in 2003 there 
were several media reports (including The Telegraph, BBC News and The 
Independent) regarding the silencing of religious rhetoric. Likewise, at the 
same time Alistair Campbell, Tony Blair’s press secretary, is widely reported 
to have intervened in an interview to prevent Blair answering a question 
about his religious beliefs; according to the reports Campbell stated, “we 
don’t do God.”35 We might also think of the media frenzy occasioned by 
Tony Blair’s remark that God will judge his decision to go to war with Iraq, 
when he appeared on the talk show Parkinson in March 2006.36 The media 
also claimed that Campbell had intervened to prevent Blair from ending 
his address to the nation on the eve of war with the words “God bless 
you.” Instead, Blair was persuaded to say “thank you,” on the grounds that 
the British people were so unaccustomed to politicians making religious 
statements that it would alienate public opinion.37 
This is simply a reﬂection of the confusion of a nation that perceives itself 
as more ideologically and culturally divided than ever – fear of terrorism 
from external and internal perpetrators informs public opinion but perhaps 
more crucially government talk of national security and British identity 
– but which is also markedly divided on the issue of whether religious faith 
is a source of or a threat to social cohesion. So given the widespread anxiety 
(and misunderstanding) in government about social cohesion and national 
identity it is unlikely that any proposals for an enlarged role for faith-based 
organizations will pass without comment.
The question is, however, whether such a secular public domain is 
possible, let alone desirable. Indeed, writing about the Australian context, 
Marion Maddox argues that a public secularism, where religious conviction 
is “edited out” of debate, may be no defence against religiously-motivated 
35 Colin Brown, “Campbell Interrupted Blair As He Spoke of His Faith: ‘We don’t do God’,” The 
Telegraph (4 May 2003). Cited 11 May 2007. Online: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main/
jhtml?xml=news/2003/05/04/nblair04.xml. 
36 Michael White, “God Will Judge Me, PM tells Parkinson,” The Guardian (4 March 2006).
37 Brown, “Campbell Interrupted Blair.”
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politics. Quite the opposite, in fact, if a minority of conservative explicitly 
religious pressure groups take it upon themselves to inﬂuence the wider 
political culture in their own image. This she terms a “subterranean 
dominionist” tendency of the government, and argues that it shows how 
neither a secular state nor secularist public rhetoric is necessarily any 
protection against religiously-motivated politics.
Instead, at least one possible outcome of public religion vacating the 
public square is that a residue remains of often less publicly visible, but 
nevertheless inﬂuential, religion with anti-democratic tendencies and 
even theocratic overtones. While Australia has a history of churches 
operating as independent voices in the public sphere, the space for 
such participation has been dramatically curtailed in recent years by a 
government determined to quarantine itself from church criticism. But, 
over the same period, government actions – from policy shifts such as 
school funding to more symbolic gestures like senior government ﬁgures 
appearing at conservative megachurch and parachurch events – conveyed 
the impression of endorsing an alternative, highly privatized model of 
Christianity in which individual economic aspiration replaces collective 
concern for social justice, while coded language of “dominion” and 
Christian supremacy transforms Australia’s traditionally tolerant public 
culture.38
A society may refuse to “do God” in the name of a classic liberal segregation 
of religion and politics, in which all partisan values and principles, especially 
those theologically-derived, are to be insulated from the public domain. In 
a “post-secular” world, however, such a distinction could actually militate 
against any kind of public transparency or accountability on the part of 
minority religious groups, by disallowing any common space in which 
religiously-motivated policies could be debated. Neither secular states nor 
secularist public rhetoric are necessarily a protection against religiously-
motivated politics – quite the opposite, in fact – if a residue or minority of 
religious parties takes on a mission of actively shaping the political or civic 
agenda. 
38 Marion Maddox, “Religion, Secularism and the Promise of Public Theology,” International 
Journal of Public Theology 1 (2007): 91.
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If religion is denied a public role, people cannot easily address the spiritual 
and moral dimension of social problems with reference to religiously-
based moral values. The result is the continued loss of res sacra humana 
in public life and the ascendancy of “instrumental reason” as the only 
appropriate language to think through dilemmas in public life.39
Rowan Williams, current Archbishop of Canterbury, has recently addressed 
this dilemma, in part in response to public debate in Britain today about 
the extent to which religion should be involved in politics and social policy. 
Williams attacks what he calls “programmatic” secularism, which takes the 
classical liberal view that religious convictions are illegitimate grounds for 
public moral reasoning by virtue of their not being universally shared:
The empty public square of programmatic secularism implies in eﬀect 
that the almost value-free atmosphere of public neutrality and the public 
invisibility of speciﬁc commitments is enough to provide sustainable 
moral energy for a properly self-critical society. But it is not at all self-
evident that people can so readily detach their perspectives and policies 
in social or political discussion from fundamental convictions that are not 
allowed to be mentioned or manifested in public.40 
Williams contrasts this characterization with an alternative, “procedural” 
secularism, which attempts to safeguard the right of all to converge on 
a space of debate and mutual respect and which neither privileges one 
particular religious position, nor requires anyone to surrender the theological 
principles on which such convictions inevitably rest:
Procedural secularism is the acceptance by state authority of a prior 
and irreducible other or others; it remains secular, because as soon as it 
systematically privileged one group it would ally its legitimacy with the 
sacred and so destroy its otherness; but it can move into and out of alliance 
with the perspectives of faith, depending on the varying and unpredictable 
outcomes of honest social argument, and can collaborate without anxiety 
39 Mary Eastham, “The Church and the Public Forum: John Courtney Murray’s Method,” 
Australian EJournal of Theology 7 (2006): 5 [cited 14 June 2007]. Online: http://dlibrary.acu.
edu.au/research/theology/ejournal/aejt_7/Eastham.htm.
40 Rowan Williams, “Secularism, Faith and Freedom,” (lecture at the Pontiﬁcal Academy 
of Social Sciences, 23 November 2006). Cited 8 August 2008. Online: http://www.
archbishopofcanterbury.org/654.
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with communities of faith in the provision, for example, of education 
or social regeneration. Further, the critical presence of communities 
of religious commitment means that it is always possible to challenge 
accounts of political reasoning that take no account of solidarities beyond 
those of the state.41 
This debate about the possibility of religion cohabiting with secular reason 
in a context of pluralism is important for our consideration of the role of the 
third sector, and the nature of the values that inform welfare reform, and I 
will return to this issue at the end. 
2 .  Theolo gical  Objections  
Yet there are also many theologians who are critical of the “liberal” approach, 
whereby the church collaborates with secular agencies and with other faiths 
on the basis of a concordat of “public reason.”42 This may be characterized as 
a shift from “liberal” to “post-liberal” theology. The tension between the two 
is well summarised by Kristin Heyer in these terms: 
One of the issues brought to the fore in the process is how theologies “go 
public” – whether, for example, the inevitability of the particular origin 
and context of religious symbols and beliefs renders them decipherable 
and meaningful only within the community of “origin,” or whether such 
particularity may actually enable more broadly compelling meaning or a 
public voice for theology … [T]hese diﬀerent approaches call into question 
41 In his lecture on “Civil and Religious Law in England,” given in February 2008 at the Inns 
of Court, Rowan Williams suggested ways of connecting Islamic or Sharia law with civil law, 
to enormous media outcry. Yet his intervention may be seen simply as an attempt to suggest 
that freedom of religious conscience is a public matter that requires some acknowledgement 
in the public realm. In making this argument, the Archbishop was acknowledging a religious 
dimension to contemporary politics: the polity of UK 2008 is partly based in a heterogeneity 
of religious traditions that many people – and especially policy makers – ﬁnd unfamiliar and 
threatening. Yet, if these religious traditions are here to stay, and if the liberal state is not about 
to shut up shop, then some public negotiation between religious traditions and the state is 
unavoidable if some measure of social cohesion is to be worked for. Williams’ comments were 
subsequently endorsed by the Lord Chief Justice, a matter which went largely unreported by 
the media.
42 John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock and Graham Ward (eds) Radical Orthodoxy: A New 
Theology (London: Routledge, 1999).
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whether “taking theology public” constitutes an imperative for theology 
or instead poses dangers to the theological enterprise.43 
A number of theologians, such as Stanley Hauerwas, Oliver O’Donovan, 
Luke Bretherton, Sam Wells and Michael Northcott, are representative 
of this view, which repudiates the compromises of public theology or 
arrangements such as Establishment. They seek “to make the turn away 
from liberal attempts to seek understandings of value and justice that are 
communicable between diverse communities and to articulate instead 
a distinctive Christian [social ethic] which has the capacity to shape the 
practice of the churches’ members.”44 For them, to be yoked to a secular 
regeneration programme, or the agenda of welfare provision, is a distraction 
from the essential and primary task of the church, which is simply to “be” 
church on its own terms. For example, Luke Bretherton argues that whilst 
many churches have taken up the oﬀer of partnership as a way of better 
serving their local neighbourhoods and of re-engaging churches with the 
political process – and see it as a proper outworking of their pastoral and 
political concern for the well-being of their communities – others are more 
critical of the co-option of churches into the government’s agenda.45 They 
challenge the neutrality of the public domain, as a space in which the sacred 
is inevitably “bracketed out,” and argue that it is not a question of the church 
getting involved in politics but being its own polis. The church must not 
conform to the parameters of acceptable speech and action based on the 
compromises of secular reason; there is no such commensurate common 
wisdom, and the church must have the courage to model itself on the 
exemplary narratives of Christ’s passion, death and resurrection. 
It is right, in one sense, for our theological reﬂection on such a matter to 
turn to the nature and calling of the church, as exemplary “communities of 
trust and love and support,” whose distinctive practices of faith show forth the 
kind of human lives that are possible under God.46 It values and emphasises 
the historic tradition of church life as deﬁnitively the means by which the 
43 Kristin E. Heyer, “How Does Theology Go Public?” Political Theology 5 (2004): 308 (emphasis 
original). 
44 Malcolm Brown, “Christian Ethics and Economics after Liberalism,” in Through the Eye of a 
Needle: Theological Conversations over Political Economy (eds. John R. Atherton and Hannah 
Skinner; Peterborough: Epworth, 2007), 54.
45 Luke Bretherton, “A New Establishment? Theological Politics and the Emerging Shape of 
Church-State Relations.” Political Theology 7 (2006): 371–92.
46 Samuel Wells, “An Anglican Critique of Establishment,” Crucible (April-June 2005): 30.
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present witness of that church continues to be shaped – and it is a shaping of 
dispositions, of virtues, of habitus. It is a thoroughly “performative” theology, 
expressing more than simply the notion that “by their fruits shall ye know 
them” – always open to a charge of instrumentalism – and more about the 
words being embedded and embodied in the actions. The public witness of 
the Church is the essence of its public theology; as Sam Wells argues, 
the central question in Christian ethics … is simply put: does it build up 
the Church? … does it build up the common life of the body of Christ, 
fostering conditions in which trust, peace and reconciliation may grow? 
And: does it appropriately display the common life of the Church in such 
a way as to demonstrate how that life is made possible by the servant 
lordship of Christ, and thus commend that life to those who do not yet 
share it?47
Such a theology must not be seen as a form of ecclesial isolationism or 
triumphalism; social justice is to be striven for, but from a position of 
counter-cultural engagement rather than compliance with secular powers. 
Since nothing can and should replicate the sovereignty of Christ, then the 
last thing the church should do is seek its own version of that in temporal 
terms, or to “impress upon those who do not share its faith an ersatz version 
of its life.”48 
These kind of voices remind us of the perennial tension for Christians 
in relation to public life and politics, how to practise the twin vocations 
of “citizenship” and “discipleship”: of liberalism’s concern to be accountable 
and contribute to the common good on the one hand, versus the call to 
live out a distinctive public witness based on the corporate practice of the 
Christian community. Voices from the Australian context show that this is a 
living question in terms of articulating a relevant public theology, especially 
in relation to participation in welfare reform. Tony Harkness, writing about 
the theological foundations of Roman Catholic schools, talks about the 
tension between “authenticity” and “inclusion”: how the Church’s education 
policy and provision can be true to tradition and the core values of the 
Church (“Have a strong Catholic identity and Give witness to Christian 
values”)49 yet reach out to wider constituencies (“Be open and accessible to 
47 Wells, “An Anglican Critique,” 30. 
48 Wells, “An Anglican Critique,” 30. 
49 Tony Harkness, “Authentic and Inclusive Catholic Schools: Some Challenging Contexts,” 
Australian EJournal of Theology 3 (2003): 2. [cited 14 June 2007]. Online: http://dlibrary.acu.
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those who seek its values”).50 This will best be achieved, he argues, through 
a “God-centred rather than Church centred theology of mission.”51 Mission, 
or involvement of Church in public policy, is not about “the work of the 
Church alone, exercised and directed through the powers and structures 
of the Church,” but is driven by an understanding of “the work of the Holy 
Spirit calling forth all of creation.”52 
Harkness here draws on the work of Peter Phan, who has argued that 
theology of mission in the Roman Catholic tradition since Vatican II 
represented a decisive shift away from a church-centred model towards 
one of God at work in the world, and a focus on the church in the world 
as an instrument or sacrament of God’s mission. The church is not an end 
in itself but a pointer to the way God acts in the world.53 Phan criticises 
pre-conciliar Catholic missiology in which “the center and heart of the 
missionary project is the church, and church understood primary in the 
institutional model,”54 understood as “unique, exclusive, superior, deﬁnitive, 
normative and absolute.”55 Hence the emphasis in post-conciliar Catholic 
theology (especially theologies of mission and contextual theologies of 
inculturation) about mission as involving the humanisation of society as 
much as expansion of the Church; but crucially, also, it asks mission to 
locate itself from a theological and apologetic vantage-point, rather than an 
ecclesiological (and ecclesiastical) one. For Phan, post-Vatican II missiology 
has restored the four elements of mission to their right order: “reign of God, 
mission, proclamation, and church.”56
I wonder therefore whether those post-liberal theologies have drifted 
towards a form of pre-conciliar theology, of privileging the work of the 
church over the reign of God. Have they allowed their suspicion of secular 
liberal humanism in the name of authenticity to push them into a latter-day 
doctrine of extra ecclesiam nulla salus? It is one thing to acknowledge the 
ideological biases of secular reason (such as social sciences), but another to 
assert that such disciplines or perspectives lack any legitimacy whatsoever; 
edu/research/theology/ejournal/Issue 3/Harkness.htm.
50 Harkness, “Authentic and Inclusive Catholic Schools,” 2. 
51 Harkness, “Authentic and Inclusive Catholic Schools,” 4.
52 Harkness, “Authentic and Inclusive Catholic Schools,” 4. 
53 David Bosch, Transforming Mission (New York: Orbis, 1991), 2
54 Peter Phan, “Proclamation of the Reign of God as Mission of the Church,”Australian EJournal 
of Theology 2 (2002): 2 [cited 14 June 2007]. Online: http://www.mcauley.acu.edu.au/theology/
Issue2/PeterPhan.htm.
55 Harkness, “Authentic and Inclusive Catholic Schools,” 4.
56 Phan, “Proclamation of the Reign of God,” 2.
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or even to argue, as post-liberals sometimes tend to do, that theology or 
the life of the church themselves never evolved in dialogue with their wider 
cultures.
Certainly, there is a danger of the church simply being conﬁned to being 
merely a constituent part of “civil society,” and post-liberals such as William 
Cavanaugh are right to protest against any such move, since it represents a 
capitulation to a division between sacred and secular that may have been 
part of a modernist orthodoxy of the separation of Church and State (in the 
name of a “programmatic” secularism which sees the necessity for a strong 
“ﬁrewall” between religious conviction and public reason), but which is now 
being challenged in the name of the “resacralisation” or “re-enchantment” 
of society.57 It is certainly the case that liberal public theologies that have 
accommodated themselves to such a compact, and which adopt a strategy 
of mediation between the speciﬁcs of Christian tradition and practice on the 
one hand and the common speech of the public domain on the other, may 
ﬁnd themselves operating from an attenuated theology and ecclesiology. 
The danger is that the churches can only operate at one remove, as it were, 
with their eﬀectiveness in inﬂuencing public policy always dependent 
on the liberal State’s constructions or understandings of public reason, 
their inﬂuence restricted to an ability for reasoned argument, or by the 
activism of Christians as part of pluralist civil society, rather than by virtue 
of the authenticity of its corporate witness as the body of Christ. In this 
respect, Cavanaugh’s vision of the church as public body politic has a 
compelling simplicity: “The role of the church is not merely to make policy 
recommendations to the state, but to embody a diﬀerent sort of politics, so 
that the world may be able to see a truthful politics and be transformed.”58 
Yet post-liberal public theology has been criticised for attempting 
to subsume all theology into ecclesiology, and of exhibiting a certain 
utopianism, if not naivety, in their hopes for the perfectibility of the Church 
as human and temporal institution. 
While many political theologians applaud postliberal theology’s defense 
of an evangelical form of ecclesial resistance to individualistic, bourgeois 
academic interpretations of Christianity, they also challenge the postlib-
eral inclination to separate the spiritual and the political, lack of attention 
57 William T. Cavanaugh, “Church,” in The Blackwell Companion to Political Theology (eds. 
Peter M. Scott and William T. Cavanaugh; Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 393–406.
58 Cavanaugh, “Church,” 404.
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to justice issues, to critiques of ideology, and to action for ecclesial and 
social reforms.59
“Engagement,” even dialogue, with institutions beyond the Church 
does not necessarily have to mean “collusion.” Tony Harkness’ conclusion 
is that authenticity and inclusivity are complementary, since inclusiveness 
without authenticity becomes bland uncritical consensus, yet authenticity 
without inclusiveness becomes inward-looking, institutional, conformist 
and conservative. Indeed, such participation in the movement of the Spirit 
in the realm of reason as well as revelation is not a betrayal but a fulﬁlment 
of theological orthodoxy: 
The point is not that Christian virtues should be distinctive in the sense 
that no one outside the faith can embody them. Rather, the test is whether 
such virtues are authentically derived from speciﬁc Christian themes 
and doctrines – then one may ask whether similar virtues may also be 
derived from other traditions and narratives. Thus, in dialogic encounter 
with others, Christians may seek moral agreements which extend beyond 
their own faith community but which do not compromise their authentic 
theological outlook.60 
c o n c l u s i o n :  r e t h i n k i n g  t h e  c o m m o n  g o o d
I have been talking about a public theology that is tradition-centred 
(authentic and ecclesial) yet open to the possibility of revelation beyond the 
tradition (inclusive and dialogical), that brings to a common realm of public 
debate the gifts of a vision rooted in identiﬁable theological values. Yet the 
public domain can neither be insulated from questions of value nor assumed 
to be immune from the considerations of religious freedom and pluralism. 
And I want to use these thoughts to develop some further pointers towards 
a renewed theological consideration of the nature of welfare reform, and the 
possible role of faith in the third sector. 
It would be a false dichotomy to suggest that the two objectives are 
mutually incompatible. Whilst post-liberal theologians are frequently 
critical of “mainstream” liberals such as Temple and Reinhold Niebuhr for 
neglecting any doctrine of the church in their public theology, Temple was 
59 Heyer, “How Does Theology Go Public?” 324.
60 Brown, “Christian Ethics and Economics after Liberalism,” 52. 
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concerned to put the church at the service of the social problems of his 
day.61 This for him was not a distraction from worship and ecclesiology 
but one public expression of its identity, rooted in the realities of Creation 
and Incarnation. “The church is holy, but holiness is not separation from 
the world. Instead, the church’s holiness is that of Jesus Christ himself, 
in its risky interaction with that world.”62 We might see this as Temple’s 
aﬃrmation of the church’s calling to participation in the world, as God’s 
world. Such a public theology is built on the reality of common grace and 
our shared humanity by virtue of bearing the imago Dei, the possibility of 
reason as well as revelation as revealing the truth, and redemption being 
about transformation and renewal of creation rather than its being totally 
remade from scratch. 
There is always a tension, however, and this is where the principle of 
Christian Realism can help us. Some critics of Temple have indeed argued 
that his optimism about the capacity of the State reﬂects a naivety or excessive 
trust in the power of human institutions alone to deliver the common good. 
The Temple of Christianity and Social Order may have placed too much trust 
in the capacity of State bureaucracy and the expertise of political elites to 
deliver eﬀective systems of welfare. Such deference to centralized power and 
the authority of the “expert,” as Mark Chapman points out, leaves Temple’s 
social ethics incapable of challenging trends such as the managerialism of 
New Labour. This results in “a virtually complete separation of the realm 
of political morality from the sphere of practical expertise. At the same 
time … the autonomy of the social sciences and economics as disciplines 
undertaken and understood only by experts … means that the scope for 
political morality is increasingly reduced.”63
However, a revised “Christian Realism” acknowledges both the necessity 
of political institutions but also their subjection to the limitations of sin.64 
This may actually entail adopting a closer engagement with those very 
institutions and processes of governance, rather than trusting – as Temple’s 
theology tended to do – in the inherent benevolence of the secular State. 
Indeed, it is arguable that Temple’s notion of intermediate associations 
serves as an antidote to this, as aﬃrming the signiﬁcance of independent, 
61 Cavanaugh, “Church,” 393–406.
62 Wendy Dackson, “Archbishop William Temple and Public Theology in Post-Christian 
Context,” Journal of Anglican Studies 4 (2006): 246. 
63 Chapman, “Ronald Preston, William Temple, and the Future of Christian Politics,” 169–70.
64 Chris Baker, The Hybrid Church in the City: Third Space Thinking (London: Ashgate, 2007), 
67–110.
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value-based, pluralist civil society between the operations of the State and 
the market.65
This takes me, ﬁnally, back to the issue of the integrity of the “third sector” 
as occupying that crucial space. Essentially, Roland Sewell’s objections to 
faith-based organizations signing up to deliver welfare services rest, it seems 
to me, on the dangers of the third sector being colonized or squeezed by 
government-driven agenda on the one hand, or the proﬁt motive on the 
other. Remember his concerns about commercialism and corporatization, 
for example: “The incorporation of faith groups into state policy, on 
conditions set by the state, and justiﬁed in instrumental terms, risks closing 
down the free, non-instrumental space that religious belief and practice 
holds open and which … is central for the formation of civil society as a 
space of free deliberation.”66
So this is about protecting the integrity of this space, which is precisely 
how Marion Maddox conceives of the terminology “public,” meaning 
everything to do with the world beyond the home, the familial and the 
domestic (noting along the way its gendered implications); we can think of 
it as the “third space” between the state and the market, “where people can 
meet independently of all those other sources of pressures and interests.”67 
Maddox develops the distinction between public and private as the 
diﬀerence between welfare provision oﬀered by the state, funded through 
public money and taxation, versus services provided by private insurance 
or commercial means. The former means public goods available to all, the 
latter those subject to market or proﬁt-motives. Maddox talks about “public” 
as free from state or market intrusion, signifying a theological stance based 
on grace rather than proﬁt or self-interest. In ways that echo Temple’s notion 
of “intermediate organizations” as an essential part of healthy civil society, 
therefore, this third space, as that neither colonized by instrumentalism 
or the secular reason of the State, nor the logic of proﬁt or managerialism 
posed by the market, seems therefore a good place, strategically, for the 
churches and public theology to locate their action and reﬂection on matters 
of welfare and the common good. 
Maddox asks, “What legitimacy can a theologically-based contribution 
claim where Christianity commands no automatic attention?”68 Is it still 
65 Atherton, Public Theology, 96.
66 Bretherton, “A New Establishment?” 6.
67 Maddox, “Religion, Secularism and the Promise of Public Theology,” 92.
68 Maddox, “Religion, Secularism and the Promise of Public Theology,” 82.
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possible to believe that theology can speak and act eﬀectively in public? 
I have been arguing that the hallmarks of authenticity – rootedness in 
but not captivity to tradition – and participation – an apprehension of a 
public theology that proclaims the presence of God-in-the-world, to the 
world – are deﬁning characteristics for a way ahead. The church draws its 
function and purpose from the world and a doctrine of creation, rather 
than from a primary concern with the identity and integrity of the church. 
Fundamentally, it testiﬁes to “the idea that God’s truth – which of course, is 
absolute truth – is approachable by all human beings,” as well as suggesting 
“that Christians should be looking for their God to be discovered in other 
people.”69 
I am calling for some kind of Christian Realism that trusts in the necessity 
of human institutions (civil, secular and ecclesial) and political processes, 
yet exercises necessary caution over their limitations, in order to maintain 
that balance between authenticity and participation. The church is not to 
be wholly identiﬁed with the spirit of any one particular age or political 
system, even though to withhold participation goes against the imperatives 
of creation and incarnation. Yet this should not diminish the right to 
exercise critical solidarity, made easier by the occupation of an autonomous 
space between State and market, in the shape of a renewed commitment to 
the third sector. A renewed Christian Realism in relation to the limitations 
and the virtues of such constructive engagement may be one of the most 
signiﬁcant contributions of such a “public theology” of welfare.
69 Brown, “Christian Ethics and Economics after Liberalism,” 63.
